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Abstract
Consider a symmetric 2-player game of complete information. Consider an ar-
bitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoﬀ-irrelevant types, independent
random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting,
while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game can diﬀer across types,
aggregate play in any such equilibrium must coincide with a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium of the complete information game. This justiﬁes the interpretation of certain
data, including many laboratory experiments, as arising from a symmetric equi-
librium, even when asymmetric equilibria exist and, in addition, subjects may be
heterogeneous.
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I. Introduction
Consider an experimentalist whose subjects are playing a symmetric 2-player game in
the lab. The analyst is interested in what behavior can arise at equilibrium. Can the
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1data be viewed as arising not from an arbitrary equilibrium but, more precisely, from
a symmetric equilibrium?1 The analyst allows for the possibility that diﬀerent types
of players, though all rational, may approach the game diﬀerently. There may be, for
instance, men and women among the players in the lab. There may be men and women
who consider themselves tough, while some consider themselves weak, etc. Is it possible
that these diﬀerent types of players end up playing diﬀerent strategies in equilibrium?
Consider generally, a symmetric game, being played by two players in the ﬁeld. Under
what conditions can we guarantee that their behavior is as if they were playing a sym-
metric equilibrium? Under what conditions is this not necessarily the case? The answers
we provide to these questions are already understood, at least informally, to a certain
extent. The value of our formalization, while not technically demanding, is to isolate the
conditions that imply that behavior will conform to a symmetric equilibrium, even when
there are asymmetric equilibria and, moreover, players may be heterogeneous.
In order to address these questions we consider a general symmetric 2-player game,
which we call the base game, and enrich it by adding a set of, and distribution over, types
of players, yielding a Bayesian extension of the base game. Call types payoﬀ irrelevant
if every type shares the same payoﬀs as given by the base game. The Bayesian extension
is said to satisfy independent random matching if the types of the two players are chosen
independently. It is said to satisfy anonymity if players’ types are private information.
We show that under the assumptions of payoﬀ-irrelevant types, independent random
matching, and anonymity, every Bayesian equilibrium of every Bayesian extension of the
base game induces aggregate play (as observed by the analyst) to be as in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the base game. It is not necessarily true, however, that every type of
player uses the same strategy. In equilibrium, however, all strategies that are used must
yield the same payoﬀ.
Anonymity and independent random matching are satisﬁed in many experimental de-
signs. In particular, the conventions of assigning subjects into pairs uniformly at random,
and preventing subjects from observing the identity of their opponent imply that these
conditions are (approximately) met.
The third assumption that all types share the same payoﬀ is not as easy to ensure, as
individuals may have heterogeneous (non-linear) utility in money, or care about outcomes
beyond their own payoﬀ. If player types have heterogeneous preferences which are close
to the preferences in the base game, then every Bayesian equilibrium of any Bayesian
1In many cases such a conclusion would reduce or even eliminate the multiplicity problem.
2extension which satisﬁes independent random matching and anonymity must be close to
a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the base game. We also discuss the eﬀects of relaxing
the two assumptions of independent random matching and anonymity.
II. Model and Main Result
Let Γ = (S,u) be a symmetric 2-player game with ﬁnite action space S and payoﬀ function
u : S ×S → IR (or u : Sn → IR) with the interpretation that u(s,s′) is the payoﬀ a player
gets when playing s against an opponent playing s′. This game Γ shall be called the base
game. Let ∆(S) denote the set of mixed actions. Let u be extended to mixed actions in
the usual expected utility way.
We shall now provide a deﬁnition of an incomplete information game that is built from
the base game. Let Θ be a ﬁnite set of types with typical element θ. Let  ∗ ∈ ∆(Θ) denote
the probability distribution over types. Let   ∈ ∆(Θ×Θ) denote the matching technology,
i.e., the probability distribution that describes the frequency with which a pair of player
types θ,θ′ is drawn. We assume that the marginal of   in both arguments is  ∗, so that
types are drawn in proportion to their frequency in the population. Let K be a ﬁnite set
of signals with typical element κ. For any type θ ∈ Θ let νθ ∈ ∆(K) denote conditional
signal distribution for type θ. That is, νθ(κ) is the probability that a type θ generates
signal κ. Signals are perfectly observable.2 Given this framework, we deﬁne a strategy
by σ : Θ × K → ∆(S) with the interpretation that σθ,κ is the (mixed) action a player of
type θ employs when encountering an opponent who so happened to generate signal κ.
This completes the description of a Bayesian extension, ΓB = [Γ = (S,u),(Θ, ),(K,ν)],
of the base game Γ.
A Bayesian extension, ΓB, satisﬁes independent random matching if  (θ,θ′) =  ∗(θ) ∗(θ′)
for all θ,θ′ ∈ Θ. That is, the matching technology is simply the product of its (equal)
marginals. The Bayesian extension satisﬁes anonymity if νθ(κ) = νθ′(κ) for all θ,θ′ ∈ Θ
and all κ ∈ K. Alternatively, in such a case we can simply write K is a singleton. The
important aspect is that no type of player can infer anything about her opponent’s type
from the observed signal.
We are interested in the following quantities derived from the strategies used in a
Bayesian extension of some base game. Let yσ(s,s′) denote the aggregate probability that
a randomly matched pair of players play action proﬁle (s,s′). Thus, yσ ∈ ∆(S × S). We
shall call yσ the aggregate distribution of play. Let y∗
σ denote its marginal (which must be
2There is little loss of generality in this, as we shall see momentarily.
3equal in both arguments). Furthermore, let zσ,θ,κ(s) denote the probability that a player
of type θ who observes signal κ faces action s. Thus, zσ,θ,κ ∈ ∆(S). That is, zσ,θ,κ(s) is
the probability that a random (under   and ν) opponent of this player type plays action
s.
We now provide an immediate, but crucial, lemma.
LEMMA 1: Let the Bayesian extension, ΓB = [Γ = (S,u),(Θ, ),(K,ν)] satisfy indepen-
dent random matching and anonymity. Fix an arbitrary strategy σ. Then
1. every type faces the same distribution of play, i.e. zσ,θ,κ = zσ for all θ ∈ Θ and all
κ ∈ K,
2. the aggregate distribution of play is the product of its two (equal) marginals, i.e.
yσ(s,s′) = y∗
σ(s)y∗
σ(s′) for all s,s′ ∈ S,
3. and the above two are identical, i.e. zσ = y∗
σ.
Proof: See Appendix.
Roughly, the idea of Lemma 1 is that, since matching is independent and signals are
uninformative, each player type, when taking her action, faces a distribution of opponent
types that is given by the population frequencies  ∗. Thus, each player type faces the same
distribution of play, which then must be equal to the marginal distribution over actions,
y∗
σ. Since under our assumptions the actions of players must be statistically independent,
the joint distribution over actions, yσ, is simply the product of its marginals.
Notice that the lemma relies in no way on payoﬀs or incentives. It is a statement
about what kind of play is (not) technologically feasible given the assumptions on the
matching process and type observability. With these observations in hand, however, it is
easy to deliver the main result that aggregate equilibrium play in a Bayesian extension
must conform to that of a symmetric equilibrium of the base game.
A Nash equilibrium of the base game is a pair of mixed actions (x,x′) ∈ ∆(S)2 such
that u(x,x′) ≥ u(s,x′) and u(x′,x) ≥ u(s,x) for all s ∈ S. It is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium if, in addition, x = x′. We shall then also call x ∈ ∆(S) a symmetric Nash
equilibrium (action) of the base game. Every symmetric game has a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.3
In order to talk about equilibria in a Bayesian extension of the base game, we need
to introduce payoﬀs to all types. For the main result we shall assume that types are
3This follows from Theorem 2 in Nash (1951).
4payoﬀ-irrelevant, which is to say that every type of every player shares the same payoﬀ
function, which is the one given by the base game. Generally, though, we introduce the
function U : Θ × S × S → IR, describing type-dependent payoﬀs. Utilities are extended
to mixed strategies in the usual way. Let, thus, Uθ(s,s′) denote the payoﬀ of player type
θ if this player plays action s while her opponent uses action s′. Given a strategy proﬁle
σ : Θ × K → ∆(S) let Uθ(σθ,κ,zσ,θ,κ) denote the expected payoﬀ to a player of type θ
upon observing the signal κ under strategy proﬁle σ.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium proﬁle σ for the Bayesian extension ΓB is such that
Uθ(σθ,κ,zσ,θ,κ) ≥ Uθ(s,zσ,θ,κ) for all s ∈ S, all θ ∈ Θ, and all κ ∈ K. Again, a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium always exists.
THEOREM 1: Let Γ = (S,u) be a symmetric 2-player base game. Then for any Bayesian
extension with payoﬀ irrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity,
and any Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ of that game we have that all types receive the same
expected payoﬀ and the induced aggregate mixed action y∗
σ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium
of the base game.
Proof: By Lemma 1 we have that zσ,θ,κ = zσ = y∗
σ for all θ ∈ Θ and all κ ∈ K. Thus,
any player of any type faces the same distribution of opponent play given by y∗
σ. Thus,
every type in the equilibrium σ must be playing a best response to y∗
σ. Thus, all types
receive the same expected payoﬀ. Furthermore as y∗
σ is simply a convex combination of
best responses to itself, it must be a best response to itself. Thus, y∗
σ is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.4 QED
III. Discussion
In this section we discuss Theorem 1 and the eﬀect of relaxing the assumptions of payoﬀ-
irrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity, by means of the simplest





This game can be viewed as a battle-of-the-sexes game, a chicken game, or a Hawk-Dove
game. Verbally the game is described as follows. Every player has two actions, H (for
4Notice that, while the notation would become more cumbersome, the argument of (Lemma 1 and)
Theorem 1 extends directly to the case of n-player symmetric normal form games.
5high), and L (for low). Let us call a typical player “You”. If you choose H while your
opponent chooses L you get a high payoﬀ of 2. If you choose L while your opponent
chooses H you get a low payoﬀ of 1. In both other cases you get a payoﬀ of zero. The
description of the game for your opponent is exactly the same. Note that this game
has a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which you play H with probability 2
3 and L with
probability 1
3. The game also has two asymmetric Nash equilibria. One in which you play
H while your opponent plays L, and another in which you play L while your opponent
plays H.
Suppose we enrich this game by considering the following Bayesian extension, in which
there are two types, call them Aristocrats and Commoners, which are payoﬀ irrelevant.
Suppose also that we have independent random matching and anonymity, so that the
conditions of Theorem 1 are satisﬁed. Suppose further that the marginal distribution over
types is such that the frequency of Aristocrats is
2
3 while the frequency of Commoners is
1
3.
Note that one of the Bayesian equilibria of this Bayesian extension is such that Aristocrats
play H while Commoners play L. Given the distribution over types, independent random
matching, and anonymity, we have that every player faces the same distribution of actions,
in this case 2
3 on H and 1
3 on L whether they are Aristocrats or Commoners. Thus, it so
happens that the presumed behavior of the two types is indeed in equilibrium. Note that
these two types could also randomize very diﬀerently in another Bayesian equilibrium. For
instance, they could of course both play the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. There
is in fact a continuum of equilibria with diﬀerent behavior for the two types.
Now, can we think of Aristocrats as those types of players that always play H (in all
Bayesian extensions with independent random matching and anonymity)? The answer
is no. Suppose that the frequency of Aristocrats is strictly above 2
3. Then there is no
equilibrium in which Aristocrats play H with probability 1. Thus, types cannot behave
equally in all Bayesian extensions. In other words, while every mixed action whose support
coincides with that of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, can be played by some type in some
Bayesian extension, the only mixed action that can be played by some type in every
Bayesian extension is the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the base game.
A. Heterogeneous preferences
In the lab the assumptions of independent random matching and anonymity are typically
satisﬁed and, in any case, can certainly be imposed. The third assumption used in The-
orem 1, the assumption of payoﬀ-irrelevant types, is not as easy to impose. For instance,
6some types of players might have preferences that are not simply linear in money. It
is easy to see, however, that as long as all types have preferences that are close to the
base game preferences, then Lemma 1 is still exactly true and an approximate version of
Theorem 1 still holds: aggregate behavior in this Bayesian extension must be close to a
symmetric Nash equilibrium.5 If there is heterogeneity in preferences such that prefer-
ences are suﬃciently diverse a puriﬁcation result6, as in Harsanyi (1973), must hold.7 Not
only is the aggregate behavior in every Bayesian Nash equilibrium close to a symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the base game, but in all of these equilibria almost every type of
player uses a pure action.
B. Type observability
What happens when anonymity is relaxed? The strongest form of departure from anonymity
is perfect observability. That is, when a pair of players are matched, their type proﬁle is
common knowledge. In this case, an equilibrium of the Bayesian extension can correspond
to any (possibly asymmetric) equilibrium of the base game. A striking example is provided
in Armstrong and Duﬀy (2010), who study the Battle of the Sexes in the online game
“World of Warcraft”. In that setting, each player has a public type which is an integer
score, which can be thought of as the player’s status in the World of Warcraft. Whenever
two players are matched, it is then common knowledge which player has the higher type
and which player has the lower type.8 One equilibrium of the Bayesian extension, and
the one that is empirically observed most frequently, is the asymmetric equilibrium where
play is coordinated on the preferred outcome of the higher type player.Note that, in this
equilibrium, the aggregate distribution of play is, of course, not a product distribution,
as it puts probability one-half on the play (H,L) and another half on (L,H). Note also
that its marginal, y∗, (the same in both arguments) attaches probability one-half on H
and one-half on L, which does not represent a Nash equilibrium of the base game. The
distribution of play diﬀerent types face is not the same either. When a high status type
faces a low status type, the high type faces a z which attaches probability one on L, while
5Suppose aggregate play was far away from a symmetric equilibrium. Then, given that diﬀerences in
preferences are slight, all types of players must have the same (pure) best response, which in itself is not
an equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium must be close to a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
6Strictly speaking this requires a continuum of types.
7Harsanyi (1973) does not speciﬁcally talk about symmetric games. Harsanyi’s (1973) Bayesian ex-
tension of a symmetric game would be such that players have roles (row and column) as well as types.
8For the sake of this discussion we assume that it is essentially impossible that two players with the
same score are matched.
7the low type faces a z which attaches probability one on H.
Suppose now that anonymity is only slightly violated. We claim that aggregate play
in any Bayesian equilibrium must be close to a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the base
game. Note that there are many forms this slight violation of anonymity could take. Let
us here focus, for the sake of simplicity, on a variant of the “almost no observability”
model employed by Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) in the context of the evolution of
preferences. Suppose K = Θ ∪ {ϕ} and νθ(θ) = ǫ, νθ(ϕ) = 1 − ǫ, and νθ(θ′) = 0 for all
θ′  = θ. This speciﬁcation of our general model implies that any player of any type has
an ǫ probability of observing the opponent type and a (1 − ǫ) probability of receiving an
uninformative signal ϕ.9 If ǫ is small then the aggregate distribution of play is essentially
determined by the behavior of types when facing the uninformative signal. Furthermore,
the behavior a player expects from an opponent when facing the uninformative signal,
again as ǫ is small, is essentially determined by the behavior of players when they, in turn,
face an uninformative signal.
We shall now argue that aggregate play in this speciﬁcation of the Bayesian extension
must be close to the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the base game. That is it must be
close to 2
3H and 1
3 L in the game at hand. Suppose σ is a Bayesian equilibrium and
aggregate play y∗
σ is not close to the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the base game. Then
aggregate type behavior against the uninformative signal is not close to the symmetric
Nash equilibrium. Then the distribution of actions faced by a player of any type when
observing the uninformative signal is not close to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. This
is true because ǫ is small. But then all such players have the same best response, either
all H if aggregate behavior favors L, or all L if aggregate behavior favors H. But then
aggregating this behavior does not lead to the supposed distribution of play and, thus, σ
cannot be a Bayesian equilibrium.
C. Correlated matching
Independent random matching in the lab is ensured if subjects are randomly drawn from
a large pool such that the exact sample of subjects is not known to the subjects. Inde-
pendent random matching can actually be slightly violated in the lab if all subjects know
the composition of the small chosen group of subjects. For instance, suppose that there
are 10 subjects and 5 of them are women, while the other 5 are men. Then a woman does
9Calling this signal ϕ uninformative is justiﬁed once one realizes that every player of every type, upon
observing this signal, faces the same conditional type distribution, which is simply µ∗.
8not face the same distribution of men and woman that a man faces. A woman is, in fact,
slightly more likely to face a man, than a man is (5
9 versus 4
9). Could this be a concern?
Generally, what is the impact of relaxing independence of the matching technology.
Assume ﬁrst, for simplicity, that there are two types, Θ = {θ1,θ2}, and that matching is
perfectly negatively correlated. Then every (asymmetric) equilibrium of the base game has
a corresponding equilibrium in the Bayesian extension. For instance, it is an equilibrium
for σ(θ1) = H and σ(θ2) = L. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1993) makes precisely
this point. They study an extensive form version of battle-of-the-sexes, in which one
player moves ﬁrst and, without seeing the ﬁrst player’s move, the other player moves
second. This game is strategically equivalent to the normal form representation of battle-
of-the-sexes given above. But empirically, as they demonstrate, play is very diﬀerent.
Why? In the normal form of the game, as we have shown, play must conform to the
unique symmetric equilibrium. But in the extensive form, it is commonly known that one
player moves ﬁrst. The observed convention is that this player chooses his most preferred
action and, rationally inferring this, the second mover concedes. Thus, the extensive form
representation has exactly the type structure given above with θ1 being the ﬁrst mover
and θ2 being the second mover and the matching is perfectly negatively correlated, such
that a ﬁrst mover will always know with certainty that she is facing a second mover and
vice versa. The resulting distribution of aggregate play (as well as the action distributions
diﬀerent types face) is (are) exactly the same as in the example of perfect observability
above.
Consider a ﬁnite type space Θ for the battle of the sexes game above. Suppose
anonymity is satisﬁed. Suppose we do not have independent random matching but have
the following matching technology. For all θ ∈ Θ we have  (θ,θ) >  ∗(θ)2. That is, every
type of player is more likely to meet their own type than would be the case under the
marginal distribution. Suppose also that for all θ,θ′ ∈ Θ with θ  = θ′ we have  (θ,θ′) is
proportional to  ∗(θ) ∗(θ′).
In this case we can show that there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilbrium for this
Bayesian extension, which is such that all types mix 2
3 on H and 1
3 on L. That is, not
only is the aggregate play as in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, but every type plays as
in the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the base game. The reason is as follows. Suppose
two types θ,θ′ use (mixed) action σθ  = σθ′. Suppose ﬁrst, that they are both totally
mixing. Then both must be indiﬀerent between H and L. However, note that because of
the matching technology, and the fact that both use diﬀerent mixed actions, both face
diﬀerent action distributions, i.e. zσ,θ  = zσ,θ′. But there is only one action distribution that
9makes a player indiﬀerent between H and L. Thus, it cannot be that both are indiﬀerent
between H and L.
Now consider the second case in which one type uses a pure action, say, w.l.o.g.
type θ plays action H. Suppose the other type plays any mixed action that attaches
positive probability to L. But then type θ faces an action distribution that attaches
more probability on H than type θ′ does, due to the positive correlation in the matching
technology. But then if type θ′ is indiﬀerent between H and L, type θ must prefer L.
Again, we arrive at a contradiction.
Third and ﬁnally, suppose that the two types both use the same pure action, say, H.
But this could only be a best reply if there are some types who play L with suﬃciently
high probability. By the previous argument, there cannot be such a type. Thus, we have
that all types must use the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium action of attaching 2
3 on
H and the remaining probability on L.
As our ﬁnal point, suppose that the matching technology has a small degree of negative
correlation as in the example of the 5 men and 5 women in the lab given above. Thus,
we have  (θ,θ) <  ∗(θ)2 for all θ ∈ Θ. Again, suppose that for all θ,θ′ ∈ Θ with θ  = θ′
we have  (θ,θ′) is proportional to  ∗(θ) ∗(θ′). Then, for exactly the same reason as in
the positive correlation case, no two types can be fully, yet diﬀerently, mixing between H
and L. However, it can now be that some types are mixing while other types play pure
actions. In fact, the discussion above shows that, for our example and ﬁxing anonymity,
there exists a continuum of equilibria essentially only in the Bayesian extension with
independent random matching. Any degree of positive correlation reduces the number of
equilibria to the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the base game, while any degree
of negative correlation reduces the number of equilibria to three.
IV. Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
Let P(θ′|θ,κ) denote the probability that a player of type θ, upon observing signal κ,
assigns to the event that he faces a player of type θ′. Given anonymity we can write
νθ(κ) = ν(κ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Given also independent random matching, we have that
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completing the proof. QED
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